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Trade Treaty Threats and Sub-National
Sovereignty: Multilateral Trade Treaties
and Their Negligible Impact on State
Laws
By DAVID I. SPECTOR*
Introduction
Depending on whom you ask, free trade is either the greatest
thing since sliced bread or a sure sign that the end is near. Advocates
extol the virtues of trade without borders: the United States Trade
Representative proudly asserts that the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) and the Uruguay Round of the World Trade
Organization (WTO), "have been responsible for annual gains of
between $1,260 and $2,040 for the average American family of four."'
Conversely, opponents of open trade decry its abysmal consequences:
Global Trade Watch (a division of Ralph Nader's Public Citizen)
claims that the WTO, "[pries] open markets for the benefit of
transnational organizations at the expense of national and local
economies,, 2 and declares that "NAFTA has cost large numbers of
individual workers their jobs."3  However, Seattle protestors and
Keynesian, neo-classical economists all agree that international
markets are more integrated today than ever before, and
consequently, the economic prospects of individual nations have
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2004. The
author would like to thank Ms. Staci Dresher, Esq. and the Public Law Research
Institute for their research, drafting and editing assistance in preparing this Note.
1. UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, Benefits of Trade (Sept. 19, 2001),
at <www.ustr.gov/new/ benefits.html>.
2. GLOBAL TRADE WATCH, World Trade Organization, at <www.citizen.org/
tradelwto/index.cfm> (visited Feb. 27, 2004).
3. GLOBAL TRADE WATCH, NAFTA and Workers' Rights and Jobs, at
<www.citizen.org/trade/nafta/jobs> (visited Feb. 27, 2004).
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become linked to the fate of the world economy.'
While debates about the benefits and detriments of free trade
seem never-ending, there has been comparatively little discussion of
the actual impact of international trade obligations on the sub-
national components of federal governments. Given the existence of
global economic interdependence, how do trade regimes like NAFTA
and the WTO affect the policies and actions of sub-national,
sovereign actors like the German Lander or the American states?
Although the relationship between America's trade treaties and the
policies of state governments has become a more visible issue in
international trade, relatively little is known about how these
international trade obligations really shape state law-making among
the fifty U.S. states.
Academics, state legislators, states' rights advocates and anti-
trade protestors claim that, in theory, free trade threatens the
sovereignty of the fifty states.5 California State Senator Sheila Kuehl
argues that her state "cannot allow agreements that are not subject to
public scrutiny or input to undo the will of the [California] voters."6
Anthony DePalma, of the New York Times, paints a more
threatening picture:
Their meetings are secret. Their members are generally unknown.
The decisions they reach need not be fully disclosed. Yet the way a
small group of international tribunals handles disputes between
investors and foreign governments has led to national laws being
revoked, justice systems questioned and environmental regulations
challenged. And it is all in the name of protecting the rights of
foreign investors under the North American Free Trade
Agreement.
4. See Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew M. Warner, Globalization and International
Competitiveness: Some Broad Lessons of the Past Decade, in GLOBAL
COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2000, at 18 (Center for International Development ed.,
2000).
5. See, e.g., A.J. Tangeman, Comment, NAFTA and the Changing Role of State
Government in a Global Economy: Will the NAFTA Federal-State Consultation
Process Preserve State Sovereignty?, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 243, 243 n.1 (1996).
6. See International Trade Agreements and the Role of the State: A Joint
Informational Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Commerce and
International Trade and the Senate Select Comm. on International Trade Policy and
State Legislation (Cal. May 16, 2001) [hereinafter Hearing] (press release of Senate
Select Comm. on International Trade Policy and State Legislation, May 15, 2001).
7. Anthony DePalma, NAFTA's Powerful Little Secret, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11,
2001, at C1.
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The weekly periodical, The Nation, goes so far as to claim that
"NAFTA has enabled multinational corporations to usurp the
sovereign powers of government, not to mention the rights of citizens
and communities."8 Framed in legal terms, these critics argue that
U.S. international trade obligations (obligations that have been
codified in multinational trade treaties) threaten the states'
sovereignty because the federal government may legally preempt any
state law that is inconsistent with an international trade agreement.9
The reality for states, however, is not so dire as analysts, pundits
and other observers fear. This Note examines how international
trade treaties have actually impacted the laws of the fifty states of the
Union. By looking at specific examples of state laws that have
implicated U.S. trade treaties, this Note proposes that although the
potential threat to state sovereignty remains real, the actual impact of
multilateral trade obligations on states has been negligible.
America's states are not at the mercy of international trade regimes;
rather, states are free to legislate with almost complete disregard for
international trade treaties, subject to a few exceptions.
Part I sets forth definitions and briefly describes the interrelation
between U.S. international trade obligations, federalism, preemption
and state sovereignty. By way of case study, Part II explores disputes
arising from challenges to state laws under NAFTA and the WTO by
examining the Methanex and Massachusetts Burma law disputes. Part
III examines the actual impact of these international trade treaties on
American states, concluding that states are generally free to legislate
without fear of actual harm for violating a U.S. trade obligation. Part
IV posits that this status quo is an undesirable situation for all actors
involved, and makes some preliminary recommendations for
potential solutions.
I. The Basics of Federalism, Preemption, Treaties and
Sovereignty
A. Terms
For ease of reference, the following terms will be used
throughout this Note: "U.S." and "America" refer to the federal
government of the United States of America; "state" refers to any of
8. William Greider, Sovereign Corporations, THE NATION, Apr. 30, 2001, at 5.
9. See, e.g., Tangeman, supra note 5, at 243 n.4.
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the fifty states that make up the United States; "nation" or "country"
refers to any country, including foreign countries and the United
States; "NAFTA" is the common abbreviation for the North
American Free Trade Agreement; "WTO" refers to both the
organization as an entity and to its governing treaties.
B. Federalism and Preemption Basics
In the United States, individual states are limited in their law-
making sovereignty by the federalist structure of the republic and the
constitutional doctrine of preemption.' The U.S. Constitution
establishes a federal system of government," delegating wide-ranging
enumerated powers to the national government, while reserving
certain powers to the states.'2 Federal laws enacted pursuant to
constitutionally enumerated powers are superior to state laws."
Through the Commerce Clause, the Constitution grants Congress the
authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations;14 because
Congress controls international commerce, states are generally
forbidden from legislating in the same arena."
Connected, but not coupled with notions of federalism, the
preemption doctrine mandates that U.S. federal law, including
treaties, supersedes inconsistent state law. 6 Preemption analysis can
be a very complicated process, 7 and a substantial body of work
discussing the nuances of U.S. Foreign Policy Preemption exists. 8
Luckily for the author, the details of preemption are of secondary
10. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-1 (3d ed.
2000).
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
13. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
15. See TRIBE, supra note 10, § 6-24.
16. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 175 (1999); United States v.
Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230-31 (1942); see generally TRIBE, supra note 10, § 6-28.
17. There are three types of preemption: Express preemption applies when
Congress expressly describes the extent to which a federal statute preempts state law.
Conflict preemption applies when a state law clashes with federal law by imposing
inconsistent obligations or interfering with the goals of the federal scheme. Field
preemption applies when a state law operates in an area of law that Congress intends
the federal government to occupy exclusively. These three types of preemption may
also overlap. See TRIBE, supra note 10, §§ 6-28-31.
18. See Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of the States in Foreign Affairs: The
Original Understanding of Foreign Policy Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 341,
342 n.1 (1999).
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importance for this Note; rather, this Note argues that with respect to
state violations of U.S. international trade obligations, legal
preemption is an extremely rare occurrence in practice. In fact, the
preemptive threat of trade treaties to inconsistent state laws is no
greater, and possibly less than the more traditional, domestic threat of
preemption by other federal laws.
C. Treaties and the Sovereignty of Sub-National Governments
Treaties are discussed in the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution in the same breath as the Constitution and the "Laws of
the United States," giving treaties the same paramount respect and
preemptive force. 9 Executive Agreements, although not treaties in
the strict Article II sense, have been recognized by U.S. courts as
constitutional, and will be treated as equivalents for the purposes of
this Note." Similarly, differences between self-executing and non
self-executing treaties are unimportant for this discussion. The key
point is that treaties, regardless of their form, have the same
preemptive effect on states as other federal laws.2
The United States is party to hundreds of international
agreements, both bilateral and multilateral, that govern trade and
commerce. 22  Analyzing the actual impact of the many bilateral
treaties on states, while potentially telling, is beyond the scope of this
Note. Rather, this Note focuses on the enforcement mechanisms of
America's two main multilateral trade regimes, NAFTA, and the
WTO. These two sets of trade obligations have received a great deal
of recent attention and regulate countless areas of commerce, trade
and investment.
Generally states try to encourage foreign direct investment and
commerce in order to increase revenue and trade, often through
innovative means. Therefore, states can benefit from increased
exports and foreign direct investment due, in part, to the existence of
international trade treaties. Additionally, as Justice Louis Brandeis
once wrote, "it is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that
19. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
20. See Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300, 1311-12 (11th
Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1039 (2001).
21. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
22. See TRADE COMPLIANCE CENTER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, TRADE
AGREEMENTS, available at <www.tcc.mac.doc.gov/cgi-
bin/doit.cgi?205:64:416890665:0> (visited Mar. 5, 2003) (listing these agreements).
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a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country., 23 States, as the laboratories for
American democracy, have been historically innovative in legislating
within their sovereign realms. States aggressively legislate to protect
their environment and their citizens' health and safety, frequently
with inventive laws and regulations. Problems can arise, however,
when a state's innovative regulation conflicts with international trade
treaties. This dilemma is at the source of a well publicized NAFTA
dispute, commonly known as the Methanex case, examined in Part II
below.
States also have a historical tradition of using spending measures
to give effect to their residents' political views." From the Boston
Tea Party to modern day procurement laws, state and local
governments have used economic legislation to raise public
awareness, express moral concern and prevent local tax dollars from
supporting offending practices. States have used these measures to
require environmental best practices and recycling, avoid purchasing
goods made by children or in sweatshops, protest South Africa's
apartheid policy in the 1980s, and promote human rights and religious
freedom in Nigeria, Indonesia and Cuba. 6 Typical legislation of this
kind either: (1) limits the procurement of goods from an offending
nation; (2) refuses to award government contracts to contractors
doing business with the offending nation; or (3) generally prevents
state agencies from doing business and procuring goods from
offending nations. Massachusetts' sanctions against Burma in 1996,
examined in Part II below, illustrate the interplay between these
traditional state interests, international treaty obligations and the
preemption doctrine. By looking at Methanex and Massachusetts'
Burma sanctions, this Note attempts to identify the theoretical
challenges these treaties present to the states, and highlight the
minimal harms these trade obligations actually impose on the
laboratories of democracy.
23. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.
dissenting).
24. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Crosby and the 'One-Voice' Myth in U.S. Foreign
Relations, 46 VILL. L. REV. 975, 995 (2001).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 996-98.
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II. WTO and NAFFA Disputes Arising from State Actions
A. The WTO and the States
The WTO provides an organized procedure and process for
settling trade disputes between countries. A WTO dispute arises
when a member nation claims that another member nation has
violated a trade agreement or a commitment that it has made in the
WTO Responsibility for settling disputes lies with the WTO
members, through the Dispute Settlement Body. 9  Of the 306
officially lodged disputes, eighty-one have been brought against the
United States." Of these, only five disputes have arisen because of
American states' practices.31 Perhaps the most well known example
of a state law that implicated the WTO was the so-called
27. WTO, TRADING INTO THE FUTURE, SETrLING DISPUTES, available at
<www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis_e/tife/displ-e.htm> (visited Feb. 27, 2004)
[hereinafter TRADING INTO THE FUTURE].
28. WTO, TRADE Topics, DISPUTE SETILEMENT, available at
<www.wto.org/english/ tratope/dispue/dispue.htm> (visited Feb. 27, 2004).
29. Id.
30. See WTO, TRADE TOPICS, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, DISPUTES
CHRONOLOGICALLY, available at <www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/
dipsu status e.htm> (visited Feb. 19, 2004) (listing the disputes in chronological
order).
31. Two of these disputes were filed because of the Massachusetts Burma Law.
See United States-Measure Affecting Government Procurement-Request for
Consultations by Japan, July 21, 1997, WT/DS95/1 [hereinafter Request for
Consultations by Japan]; United States-Measure Affecting Government
Procurement-Request for Consultations by the European Communities, June 26,
1997, WT/DS88/1 [hereinafter Request for Consultations by the EC]. One dispute
that never proceeded beyond initial consultations involved measures imposed by
South Dakota that prohibited entry or transit to Canadian trucks carrying cattle,
swine and grain. See United States-Certain Measures Affecting the Import of
Cattle, Swine and Grain from Canada-Request for Consultations from Canada,
Sept. 29, 1998, WT/DS144/1. Another dispute whose process has stalled involves the
"Equalizing Excise Tax" imposed by Florida on processed orange and grapefruit
Juice produced from fruit grown outside the United States. See United States-
Equalizing Excise Tax Imposed by Florida on Processed Orange and Grapefruit
Products-Request for Consultations from Brazil, Mar. 26, 2002, WT/DS250/1. The
only seemingly active dispute involves both state and federal laws. The governments
of Antigua and Barbuda allege that, cumulatively, certain federal, state and local laws
violate the WTO with respect to the "cross-border supply of gambling and betting
services." See United States-Measure Affecting the Cross-border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services-Request for the Establishment of a Panel by
Antigua and Barbuda, June 13, 2003, WT[DS285/2. These and all other WTO
disputes mentioned in this article are available at <http://docsonline.wto.org>. Data
is current as of February 2004.
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"Massachusetts Burma Law."
Background
In the mid-1990s, international attention focused on Burma
(a.k.a. Myanmar) due to the ruling military regime's widely
recognized human rights abuses against its people.32 In response, the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts enacted a law in 1996 that limited
state agencies from procuring goods and services from individuals or
companies doing business with Burma.33 By the time this dispute
reached the U.S. Supreme Court, nineteen other U.S. state and local
governments had enacted similar laws."
The Massachusetts law specifically identified, and publicly listed,
companies that (1) were doing business with Burma, and (2) were
simultaneously seeking procurement contracts with Massachusetts.35
The law did not prohibit private investment in Burma; rather, it
established a "preference requirement" that penalized companies
doing business with Burma with a 10 percent mandatory increase in
those contractors' bids for Massachusetts procurement contracts.36
Approximately one year after the passage of the Massachusetts law,
President Bill Clinton implemented federal sanctions (previously
authorized by Congress) against Burma. The sanctions, prohibited,
among other things, new investment by Americans in Burma.37
Although the Massachusetts law and the federal law shared the goal
of influencing the human rights situation in Burma, the two laws used
substantially different measures to achieve this goal.38
In 1997, after having filed formal diplomatic protests about the
Massachusetts law with the United States, the European Union (EU)
and Japan both filed formal complaints against the United States at
the WTO, alleging that by virtue of the Massachusetts law, the United
32. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Burma, in WORLD REPORT 1998, available
at <www.hrw.org/worldreport/Asia-01.htm#P127_40364> (last modified Mar. 3,
2003).
33. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 366-67 (2000).
34. Id. at 372 n.5.
35. Id. at 367.
36. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 7, §§ 22G-22M (West 1996).
37. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 570, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-167
(1996); 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2002); Exec. Order No. 13,047, 62 Fed. Reg. 28,301 (May
20, 1997).
38. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act § 570; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 7, §§ 22G-22M (West 1996).
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States had violated the Agreement on Government Procurement
(GPA).39 The GPA requires "non-discriminatory practices and open
procedures in government procurement among member nations, and
covers not only central government purchasing of goods, but also
procurement of services, including public works, and procurement at
the sub-central levels of government. 40 In 1998, the National Foreign
Trade Council (NFTC) sued Massachusetts in federal district court
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from the Massachusetts
law.41  The NIFTC argued that the Massachusetts law was
unconstitutional because it infringed on the federal foreign affairs
power, violated the Foreign Commerce Clause and was preempted by
the federal Burma law. 42 Although resolved independently from each
other, the Supreme Court case and the WTO dispute were
inextricably related.
Treaty Mechanics
In the WTO, a dispute may be initiated only by a member
country (contrast with NAFTA, where individual investors also have
the ability to bring claims) against another member country.43 If a
WTO member country feels another member has violated an
international trade agreement, the complaining country formally asks
for consultations with the alleged violating country." If consultations
fail, the complaining country requests a panel (similar to a tribunal)
to review the claim. 45 The independent panel members are generally
39. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 382-83 (2000); Request
for Consultations by Japan, supra note 31; Request for Consultations by the EC,
supra note 31.
40. WTO, MINISTERIAL CONFERENCES, SINGAPORE, MEDIA BRIEFS,
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT, available at <www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/ministe/
min96_e/govproc. htm> (visited Mar. 6, 2003). The cornerstone of the GPA is
national treatment: foreign suppliers, goods and services must be given treatment in
government procurement no less favorable than that accorded to national suppliers,
goods and services. Id.
41. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287 (D. Mass. 1998).
The NFTC is an association of companies engaged in foreign commerce: thirty-four
of its members were identified on Massachusetts' list, and one member had its bid for
a procurement contract increased by 10% in accordance with the legislation. See
Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 48 (1st Cir. 1999).
42. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 371.
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selected by the member countries involved in the dispute.46 If the
panel decides that the disputed trade measure violates the treaty in
question, the panel recommends that the offending country change its
practice to conform with the trade treaty." If the offending country
refuses to change the offending law or practice, the complaining
country is then authorized to impose retaliatory trade sanctions on
the offending country. 8 This adjudication proceeds according to strict
timelines and established procedural rules.49  For example, the
countries involved can make use of expert testimony, and have access
to limited appeals (within the WTO framework), if they so desire."0
The United States Trade Representative (USTR) handles the WTO
dispute resolution for the United States.5
In 1997 both the European Union (EU) and Japan requested
consultations with the United States regarding the Massachusetts
Burma law.52 Both countries claimed that the United States had
violated the GPA because the Massachusetts law: (1) set conditions
on companies that were not essential to their ability to complete a
contract; (2) imposed qualifications on companies and allowed
contract awards based on political, rather than economic,
considerations; (3) limited access of foreign companies to
Massachusetts; and (4) generally impeded the objectives of the
GPA.53  Both countries were also "very concerned" by the
proliferation of similar legislative initiatives taken by other state and
local governments."
After consultations between the United States, Japan and the
EU proved fruitless, a dispute panel was established by the WTO's
Dispute Settlement Body.55 Although he Panel was suspended after a






51. See OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, WTO AND
MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS, WTO, AMERICA AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
available at <www.ustr.gov/html/wtousa.html> (visited, Mar. 6, 2003).
52. Request for Consultations by Japan, supra note 31; Request for Consultations
by the EC, supra note 31.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. WTO Dispute Settlement Body-Minutes of Meeting, Oct. 21, 1998,
WT/DSB/M/49.
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unconstitutional,56 it is instructive to speculate about what might have
happened in the WTO dispute settlement proceedings.
Let us assume that after the United States had presented its case,
the Panel eventually ruled against the United States, holding that the
Massachusetts law violated the terms of the GPA. The federal
government could have then negotiated with Massachusetts to try and
change or revoke the law, or could have sued in federal court to
preempt the Massachusetts law.57 Because of the existence of the
NFTC's action, the United States probably would not have had to sue
Massachusetts itself. However, it is anyone's guess whether the
United States would have sued Massachusetts absent the private
party action.
Failing a compromise between the United States and
Massachusetts, the EU and Japan could have legally enacted
retaliatory sanctions by targeting U.S. companies bidding for
procurement contracts in Europe and Japan, even if these companies
had no contact with Burma whatsoever. To illustrate, in April of
1999, a WTO panel ruled against the EU, finding that the EU banana
importation regime violated international trade rules, unfairly hurting
U.S. banana producers.59 Marking the first time retaliatory sanctions
were authorized by the WTO, the United States legally targeted
certain exports from specific industries and countries for retaliation;
these countries and goods had nothing to do with bananas, but rather,
included Louis Vuitton plastic handbags from France, percorino
cheese from Italy and cashmere sweaters from England." Revisiting
our WTO/Massachusetts example, the companies and industries
targeted for retaliation there could have had zero contacts with
56. Trade Policy Review Body-Trade Policy Review-United States-Minutes
of Meeting-Addendum-Outstanding Responses to Questions, Sep. 3, 2000,
WTi/TPR/M/56.
57. See generally TRIBE, supra note 10, § 6-28.
58. The U.S. Amicus Brief to the Supreme Court in Crosby argued forcefully in
favor of preemption. See Brief of Amicus Curiae United States, Crosby v. Nat'l
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (No. 99-474).
59. European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution
of Bananas-Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article
22.6 of the DSU-Decision by the Arbitrators, Apr. 9, 1999, WT/DS27/ARB
[hereinafter Regime for Bananas].
60. See, e.g., Helene Cooper, U.S. Starts its Threatened Banana Fight With
Europe, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 1999, at A2; John Simons, Handbags, Bed Linens
Included in List of Goods Covered by Trade Sanctions, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 1999, at
A24.
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Massachusetts or Burma, and still have been the victim of the
retaliatory sanctions. The dispute never reached that boiling-point,
however, because the Massachusetts Burma law was successfully
challenged in the U.S. court system.
B. The Supreme Court's Decision
In 2000, the Supreme Court ruled in Crosby v. National Foreign
Trade Council that the Massachusetts law was preempted by the
federal Burma legislation, but declined to address the foreign affairs
power or the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause arguments.61
Crosby was a case decided on traditional preemption grounds without
directly relying on the existence of a trade treaty. The Court ruled
that the Massachusetts Burma law was preempted by the federal
Burma law, reasoning first, that Congress intended the federal law to
give the President flexible and effective control over economic
sanctions against Burma; second, that Congress intended to limit
economic pressure against Burma to a specific range; and finally, that
the Massachusetts law was "at odds" with the President's authority to
speak for the United States.
The Court explained that because federal law expressly
authorized the President to have power and control over economic
sanctions, the Massachusetts law "obscured" the President's ability to
effectively wield sanctions." The Court found that the Massachusetts
law limited the President's diplomatic effectiveness because it
impaired his ability to work with foreign allies in addressing the
situation in Burma free from inconsistencies. 6' The Court cited the
EU and Japanese WTO complaints as evidence that the
Massachusetts law impeded the President's ability to speak with "one
voice" for the United States.6" Furthermore, the Court cited the
WTO proceedings as evidence that the Massachusetts law
complicated the Executive Branch's relationship with other countries,
and was an impediment to accomplishing congressional objectives of
comprehensiveness and multilateral cooperation in implementing
federal law.' The Supreme Court concluded that "this evidence ... is
61. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373-74, 374 n.8 (2000).
62. Id. at 374, 377, 380.
63. Id. at 381.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 383.
66. Id. at 383-84.
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more than sufficient to show that the [Massachusetts] Act stands as
an obstacle in addressing the congressional obligation to devise a
comprehensive, multilateral strategy.
67
C. NAFTA and the States
NAFTA is a multilateral trade and investment treaty among
Mexico, Canada and the United States, and has been in effect for just
over ten years.m NAFTA provides a framework for the liberalization
of trade barriers by gradually eliminating tariffs between the three
member countries. 69 NAFTA contains numerous mechanisms for
resolving disputes: Chapter 11 provides for "investor-to-state" dispute
resolution, a mechanism that allows any private investor or
corporation to bring a complaint directly against any government of a
NAFTA member, and have it heard by a private international
tribunal.0 In the past ten years, sub-national governmental laws
(among all three NAFTA members) have accounted for eight of the
thirty available Chapter 11 complaints.71 Of these eight, only three
arise from American state laws or regulations. The Methanex case is
one of these disputes.
Background
In response to complaints about groundwater, lake and reservoir
contamination, the California legislature passed the MTBE Public
Health and Environmental Protection Act73 in 1997 to study the
health effects of MTBE, a chemical additive that helps gasoline to
burn more cleanly." The legislation authorized a study of the health
67. Id. at 385.
68. See OFFICE OF NAFTA AND INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF COMMERCE, NAFTA Implementation, available at <www.mac.doc.gov/nafta/
implement.html> (visited Feb. 27, 2004).
69. See id.
70. OFFICE OF NAFTA AND INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE, NAFTA Text, Chapter 11 [hereinafter Chapter 11], available at
<www.mac.doc.gov/nafta/ chapterll.html> (visited Feb. 27, 2004).
71. See NAFTALaw.org, The Disputes, available at <www.naftaclaims.com>
(visited Feb. 27, 2004) (listing the Chapter 11 disputes). Data is current as of March
2003. Canada and the United States must publish all NAFTA tribunal awards. See id.
Although Mexico has discretion to keep NAFTA tribunal awards private, Mexico has
pledged to support openness and transparency instead. See id.
72. See id. The Loewen, Mondev and Methanex cases each arise from alleged
state violations of Chapter 11. See id.
73. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25299.37.1 (West 1999).
74. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Pollutants/Toxins, MTBE,
Gasoline, at <www.epa.gov/mtbe/gas.htm> (last updated July 2, 2002).
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effects of MTBE and allowed the Governor to phase out MTBE if the
additive ultimately proved to be harmful. 75  Researchers at the
University of California at Davis (UC Davis) determined that MTBE
had indeed contaminated lakes, groundwater sites and public water
systems throughout the state. Moreover, the UC Davis study
concluded that MTBE was carcinogenic and that its costs outweighed
its benefits.76 Based on the UC Davis findings, Governor Gray Davis
began the MTBE phase-out process in 1999.
77
Methanex Corporation (Methanex), a Canadian company, is the
world's largest producer and marketer of Methanol,8 the key
ingredient in MTBE. Methanex, however, does not actually make
MTBE itself. In December 1999, Methanex filed a claim against the
United States, arguing that California's MTBE phase-out violated
certain provisions of NAFTA's investment chapter. 79  A NAFTA
arbitration panel is currently adjudicating Methanex's claims.8"
Treaty Mechanics
The NAFTA investment chapter, commonly referred to as
Chapter 11, has provisions designed to protect private cross-border
investors (including foreign corporations) and to facilitate the
settlement of related disputes.1 In theory, laws that govern almost
75. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25299.37.1.
76. MTBE RESEARCH PROGRAM, UC Toxic SUBSTANCES RESEARCH AND
TEACHING PROGRAM, Fact Sheet, UC Report: MTBE Fact Sheet (Nov. 12, 1998),
available at <www.ucdavis.edu>.
77. Methanex, MTBE and NAFTA, available at <www.methanex.com/
investorcentre/MTBE.htm> (visited Mar. 6, 2003). The phase-out of MTBE was
postponed until December 31, 2003. Press Release, Office of the Governor,
Governor Davis Allows More Time for Ethanol Solution (Mar. 15, 2002), available at
<www.energy.ca.gov/releases/2002_releases/2002-03-15__governor_mtbe.htm> (visited
Mar. 1, 2004). The California Energy Commission confirmed that California
refineries had successfully phased out MTBE use by the December 31, 2003 deadline.
MICHAEL NYBERG & JEFF POTEET, CAL. ENERGY COMM'N, PUB. No. 300-03-001V4,
QUARTERLY REPORT CONCERNING MTBE USE IN CALIFORNIA GASOLINE: OCTOBER
1 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 2003-REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, (Feb. 20, 2004).
78. Press Release, Methanex Corporation, Methanex Files Amended NAFTA
Claim (Mar. 8, 2001), available at <www.methanex.com/investorcentre/MTBE.htm>.
79. Notice of Arbitration Under the Arbitration Rules of the UN Commission on
International Trade Law and the North American Free Trade Agreement, between
Methanex Corporation and the United States (Dec. 3, 1999), available at
<www.naftaclaims.com>.
80. See OFFICE OFTHE LEGAL ADVISOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Methanex Corp. v.
United States of America, available at <www.state.gov/s/l/c5818.htm> (visited Feb. 25,
2004).
81. OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, International Claims
and Investment Disputes, NAFTA Investor-State Arbitrations, at
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any imaginable area are potentially susceptible to challenge by a
cross-border investor, so long as the investor has a colorable claim of
expropriation or unfair treatment.82 A private party (the Claimant)
can initiate a claim for money damages against the federal
government of the country where the Claimant's investment is
located. 3 A claim for compensation is filed against the national
government, even though the challenged law may have been enacted
on a local or state level.8' The Claimant selects a set of international
arbitration rules to govern the proceeding, and arbitrators are
selected by the parties.85 The parties then submit their arguments to
the arbitrators in written briefs. The entire arbitration process can
take years to complete before a decision on damages is made.'
Here, Methanex's claim for economic damages is rooted in three
distinct legal theories. First, Methanex alleges that California's
MTBE phase-out is based on suspect scientific data, and therefore,
the United States has not given Methanex "fair and equitable
treatment" in accordance with NAFVA and international law.87 Put
<www.state.gov/s/l/c3439.htm> (visited Feb. 27, 2004).
82. There is almost no limit to the types of laws that could be challenged under
Chapter 11. Regulations regarding food quality and agricultural safety,
environmental protection, state purchasing and contract preferences, economic
development, banking and insurance, growth controls, fair labor purchasing, etc.,
could all potentially be susceptible to a Chapter 11 challenge, assuming the law treats
a foreign investor unfairly when compared to U.S. counterparts. See Hearing, supra
note 6 (presentation of Dr. Robert Stumberg, Professor of Law, Harrison Institute
for Public Law, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.).
83. OFFICE OF NAFTA AND INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, NAFTA Text, Chapter Twenty: Institutional Arrangements and Dispute
Settlement Procedures, available at <www.mac.doc.gov/nafta/chapter20.html> (visited
Feb. 27, 2004).
84. 19 U.S.C. § 3312 (1999). The NAFTA implementing legislation mandates a
Federal-State consultation process for addressing issues that have a direct impact on
the states: each state has designated a single point of contact to communicate with the
USTR. Id.; see Hearing, supra note 6 (presentation of Mr. Lon Hatamiya, California
Secretary of Technology, Trade and Commerce Agency). The relationship between
the USTR and the states is examined infra at Part III.
85. Chapter 11, supra note 70.
86. For example, another NAFTA Chapter 11 case, Metalclad Corporation v.
United Mexican States, took almost five years to resolve. See NAFTALaw.org, The
Disputes, available at <www.naftaclaims.com> (visited Feb. 27, 2004).
87. In the Matter of a Claim under Chapter 11, Section A of the North American
Free Trade Agreement and in the Matter of an Arbitration under UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules, between Methanex Corporation and the United States, Statement
of Claim (Dec 3, 1999), 34, available at <www.naftaclaims.com> [hereinafter
Statement of Claim].
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simply, NAFTA forbids the United States from favoring domestic
corporations over Canadian and Mexican companies." Taken to its
extreme, this regulation means any state law that negatively impacts a
foreign corporation (whether directly or indirectly), but does not
affect a U.S. corporation, could be subject to a Chapter 11 challenge.
Second, Methanex claims the California phase-out amounts to an
expropriation of a Methanex investment because its business of
selling methanol for use in MTBE in California gas will end.89
Analogous to the U.S. legal concept of takings, under NAFTA, a
member country must compensate a foreign investor for any
expropriation (or a measure tantamount to expropriation) of their
investment.' Here, Methanex claims that it should be compensated
for the profits it could have earned from MTBE sales, had California
not banned the gasoline additive.91
Finally, Methanex alleges that they have been discriminated
against by virtue of an "improper" campaign contribution made to
Governor Davis that influenced California policy with respect to
MTBE.92 Archer-Daniels-Midland, a domestic producer of ethanol,
which competes with MTBE as an emission reducing gasoline
additive, legally donated money to Governor Davis' election
campaign. However, Methanex argues that this contribution, while
not illegal per se, influenced Davis to phase out methanol in favor of
ethanol, thereby violating NAFTA by giving preferential treatment to
a domestic firm over a foreign company.93
Although the procedural mechanisms that govern the NAFTA
arbitration process are fairly straight-forward, there are a few specific
procedures worth noting. The arbitration panel uses principles of
international law, not U.S. law, to rule on Methanex's claims.94 The
U.S. State Department defends the United States in most NAFTA
88. Chapter 11, supra note 70.
89. Statement of Claim, supra note 87, $ 35.
90. Hearing, supra note 6 (presentation of Mr. Martin Wagner, Lawyer,
International Program, Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund, San Francisco, California).
91. Statement of Claim, supra note 87, 38.
92. In the Arbitration under Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade
Agreement and under UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, between Methanex
Corporation and the United States, Claimant Methanex Corporation's Draft
Amended Claim (Feb. 12, 2001), $ I.A., available at <www.naftaclaims.com>.,
93. Id. $ VI.B.
94. Chapter 11, supra note 70.
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Chapter 11 cases,95 while most complaining investors (including
Methanex) retain private counsel for the NAFTA arbitrations. In
August of 2002, the NAFTA Panel ruled that it did not have
jurisdiction over Methanex's claims, as pleaded.96 The Panel allowed
Methanex to clarify its argument and to specifically show how
California targeted foreign Methanol producers.9 In November 2002,
Methanex filed its Second Amended Statement of Claim, which the
98Panel is currently reviewing.
III. Actual Legal Impact of International Trade Treaties on the
States
Generally, states face little actual, direct harm for violating U.S.
trade obligations governed by international trade treaties. It is
important to keep in mind that many laws established by treaties also
have domestic corollaries enacted by Congress, implicating traditional
preemption. However, if no domestic corollary exists, and the treaty
is the only legal violation in question, states have little to fear from
violating these international legal norms. Indeed, the USTR, Robert
Zoellick, has stated that "the WTO and NAFFA agreements do not in
any way preempt or invalidate... local laws that may be inconsistent
with those agreements."'  Zoellick reasons that although the United
States has committed itself to adhere to treaty rules, "those rules do
not have direct effect in U.S. law."'1  For one thing, treaties are
unenforceable by private parties or other countries in U.S. courts: the
states cannot be directly attacked for treaty violations unless the
United States brings suit against the state, claiming preemption."'
Furthermore, it is the U.S. federal government that pays the price,
95. OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, NAFTA Investor-State
Arbitrations, at <www.state.gov/s/l/c3439.htm> (visited Feb. 27, 2004).
96. Methanex Corporation v. United States, NAFTA Tribunal First Partial Award
(Aug. 7, 2002), $ 172, available at <www.state.gov/s/l/c5818.htm>.
97. See id.
98. See In the Arbitration under Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade
Agreement and under UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, between Methanex
Corporation and the United States, Claimant Methanex Corporation's Second
Amended Statement of Claim (Nov. 5, 2002), available at <www.naftaclaims.com>.
99. Hearing, supra note 6 (Appendix i, letter from Robert Zoellick to California
State Senator Sheila Kuehl, Mar. 26, 2001).
100. Id. Surprisingly (or perhaps not), Zoellick's statement directly contradicts
the generally accepted interpretation of the Supremacy Clause, namely, that the
Constitution, federal laws and treaties are superior to state laws.
101. See 19 U.S.C. § 3312 (1999).
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literally, for state violations of trade treaties." In both NAFTA and
the WTO, the United States must defend a state's practice, and if
unsuccessful, the United States faces legal penalties for the offending
state's practice.
At this point it is worth briefly exploring the role the USTR (and
to some extent, the State Department) plays in the international trade
treaty dispute resolution process. Both the NAFTA and GATT
implementing legislation provide for a consultation process when a
state law conflicts with a treaty."3 During this process the USTR
works with the offending state to try to achieve conformity with the
state law and the treaty."° Additionally, the USTR must inform states
of any matters that "directly relate to, or will potentially have a direct
impact on" any state.05 States, in turn, can inform the USTR of their
positions on treaty matters, which the USTR must take into account
in formulating its positions for treaty negotiations."' States are also
supposed to be involved at each stage of the development of U.S.
positions regarding treaty matters."0 7 Furthermore, states have a right
to participate in the defense of their laws and to be notified of the
proceedings other than challenges that might have a potential state
impact. 08
Juxtaposed with this apparent collaborative process, the USTR is
legally obligated to defend a state law that violates an international
treaty. Any American law challenged by a WTO member, regardless
of whether it is a federal or state law, must be defended by the USTR
at the WTO °9 However, the USTR (and State Department) are
102. See 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1999); 28 U.S.C. § 2414 (2002), 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (2002);
Principles of Federal Appropriations Law, 2d ed., Vol. III, GAO/OGC-94-33, Nov.
1994 (General Accounting Office, Office of General Counsel).
103. 19 U.S.C. §§ 3312(b)(1), 3512(b)(1).
104. Id.
105. 19 U.S.C. §§ 3312(b)(1)(B), 3512(b)(1)(B). The USTR does this through a
state Single Point of Contact in each state who is in day-to-day contact with the
USTR. See Hearing, supra note 6 (Appendix i, letter from Robert Zoellick to
California State Senator Sheila Kuehl, Mar. 26,2001).
106. 19 U.S.C. § 3312(b)(2), 3512(b)(2). The USTR has established an
Intergovernmental Policy Advisory Committee on Trade, through which the state
can advise the USTR on trade matters. See Hearing, supra note 6 (Appendix i, letter
from Robert Zoellick to California State Senator Sheila Kuehl, Mar. 26, 2001).
107. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 3312(b)(1), 3512(b)(1).
108. NAFTA Implementing Act, H.R. 3450, 103d Cong. (1993) pmbl.
109. See Hearing, supra note 6 (Documents, Memorandum from the National
Conference of State Legislatures regarding State Legislative Authority under NAFFA
and GATT, at 3).
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executive branch agencies, duty-bound to the President of the United
States. If a challenged state law is contrary to a particular U.S. policy,
the executive branch, through the USTR, may put pressure on a state
to change or modify its law.1 ' One can understand the states'
misgivings about relying on the USTR to defend their laws at WTO
or NAFTA dispute resolutions. The same institution that is charged
with the states' legal defense is also simultaneously charged with
pressuring the states to modify their laws in order to conform with
international treaties. Although this positioning of the USTR
certainly raises domestic political and federalism issues, the USTR's
unique position does not seem to raise any real international treaty
concerns. States may indeed legislate in accordance with
international treaties because it is in their self-interests or to avoid a
federalism confrontation with the executive branch, but states have
little direct incentive to comply with the terms of an international
treaty for the sake of mere compliance.
Therefore, politics aside, an international trade treaty's only
direct threat to a state is when a WTO panel rules against the United
States in an arbitration and retaliatory sanctions are authorized.
Even then, the effect on a state will likely be small and localized to a
certain industry or a certain practice.1 ' A state that chooses to violate
trade treaties with impunity, however, faces a number of indirect,
negative domestic consequences. We will revisit our case examples to
explore these issues in detail.
A. Impact of WTO Violations on States
The Crosby decision illustrates how America's WTO obligations
have little direct impact on the states. Although states always face
the domestic challenge of legal preemption,"2 states are immune from
suit by WTO members in U.S. courts for violating the terms of a
WTO agreement."' The United States bears the costs of the dispute
resolution at the WTO, and if the United States loses its dispute,
retaliatory sanctions may not reach the violating state at all."'
Although states have the potential to be harmed by retaliatory
sanctions, and face uncertain domestic political ramifications from
110. Id.
111. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 60, 102 and accompanying text.
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violating U.S. trade obligations, generally a state that violates a WTO
trade obligation walks away scot-free.
The domestic guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court in
Crosby seem clear: when confronted with inconsistent federal
legislation, a state may not enact legislation that impairs the
President's ability to conduct foreign policy with one voice."' Despite
the fact that a federal law and a similar state law may have the same
goal, it is a basic constitutional principle that the federal law will
always preempt the state law.
116
Absent domestic preemption, however, the legal consequences
of states violating U.S. trade obligations are negligible. States cannot
be sued for violating a WTO agreement; rather, it is the U.S. federal
government that will be brought into WTO dispute settlement
proceedings."7 Furthermore, the WTO dispute resolution system is
organized in a manner that encourages settlement, rather than
adjudication, of claims."' If a state law is challenged, the USTR could
settle the dispute with the complaining country. As always,
settlement demands compromises, which implies that the USTR
would seek flexibility from the state in modifying its law so that it
would no longer violate WTO trade rules. However, the state is
under no legal obligation to change its practice. As Crosby illustrates,
states will generally fight hard to retain their sovereignty, whether
real or perceived."9
If the state fails to modify its law, the complaining country will
institute legal retaliatory sanctions against the United States.'20
Retaliatory sanctions are generally illegal under international law.
However, they are the officially authorized punishment for a country
that violates an international trade agreement. Although the
sanctions will be directed towards the WTO member country, the
effect is frequently local. For example, in the recently publicized
"banana case," the United States enacted retaliatory sanctions against
the EU by targeting specific brands and products of particular regions
and localities.12' Consequently, chances are good that an American
115. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381 (2000).
116. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
118. TRADING INTO THE FUTURE, supra note 27.
119. See, e.g., Crosby, 530 U.S. at 363.
120. See TRADING INTO THE FUTURE, supra note 27.
121. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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state that initially causes a WTO dispute could escape sanctions
altogether.
Ironically, the WTO's only direct legal impact on the states could
have nothing to do with sub-national violations of international trade
treaties. States always face the threat of retaliatory sanctions, should
the United States lose a WTO dispute.' Regardless of whether a
WTO claim against the United States is the result of a federal or state
WTO violation, the retaliatory sanctions imposed on the United
States could impact any state's producers by imposing restrictive
countervailing duties. Moreover, one state's violation of a WTO
obligation could ultimately cause sanctions to be imposed on another
state, otherwise completely innocent in the dispute. Therefore, states
like California, with large export markets, are always likely targets of
retaliatory sanctions, regardless of whether they comply with WTO
obligations. It is important to note, however, that in over three
hundred WTO disputes, only one dispute ended with the WTO
authorizing retaliatory sanctions.23
The largest impact the WTO dispute resolution system has on
states is indirect, and relates to the politics of federalism. Although
the USTR will forcefully defend a state's challenged trade practice,
the USTR's position is complicated by its dual role. Should the
United States lose at the WTO, the executive branch faces the
economic and political fallout of retaliatory sanctions imposed on an
unknown U.S. industry.'24 Presumably, the USTR and the rest of the
executive branch want to avoid being an indirect cause of sanctions
on American producers. Therefore, the USTR has an incentive to
avoid these sanctions by pressuring the offending state to modify its
treaty-violating legislation. Taken to the extreme, this situation could
have disastrous implications for U.S. federal/state relations. Would
the President or Congress overtly try to pressure states that violate
international trade laws? Could the threat of WTO retaliatory
sanctions on the United States cause the federal government to
retaliate against the states by withholding federal funds for unrelated
programs? Or would the United States file suit against a state in
order to preempt the state's law, knowing the litigation costs and the
political repercussions such a court battle would inevitably bring?
122. See supra notes 48, 60 and accompanying text. Data current as of March
2003.
123. Regime for Bananas, supra note 59.
124. See supra notes 48, 60 and accompanying text.
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The answers to these questions are unknown. What is clear, however,
is that the greatest direct impact the WTO has on states will
ultimately be realized through old fashioned American politics, rather
than the legal enforcement of international norms.
B. Impact of NAFTA Violations on States
The Methanex case also provides a good example of how
America's NAFTA obligations actually have little direct effect on the
states. Although state laws will always face potential challenges by
individual investors, the states themselves are exposed to no legal
liability from a challenging investor.12 The U.S. Department of State
bears the costs of the NAFTA arbitration, and if the United States
loses its NAFTA arbitration, an adverse damage award is paid by the
federal government.26 Although states face uncertain domestic
political ramifications from violating NAFTA obligations, generally
there is no adverse legal impact on a state that violates a NAFT'A
provision.
State laws, like their federal counterparts, are always vulnerable
to challenge by a NAFTA country, or more likely, an individual
investor like Methanex. Approximately 10 percent of NAFTA
Chapter 11 challenges have been directed at sub-national laws or
practices.' 27 However, the state practice or law that is challenged is
brought against, and defended by, the NAFTA member's national
government.' The sub-national government is exposed to no legal
liability from a NAFTA challenge. In America, the possibility that a
state law might be preempted only exists if suit is brought by the
federal government or by an American private party with standing to
129
sue.
A nation that violates the NAFTA investment chapter is
125. See supra notes 83, 84 and accompanying text.
126. See 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1999); 28 U.S.C. § 2414 (2002); 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (2002);
Principles of Federal Appropriations Law, 2d ed., Vol. III, GAO/OGC-94-33, Nov.
1994 (General Accounting Office, Office of General Counsel).
127. There have been three claims aimed at American states, including the
Loewen, Mondev and Methanex disputes. One claim has been brought against a
Canadian Province, the Sun Belt dispute. Four claims have been aimed at Mexican
states or municipalities, including the Azinian, Calmark, Metalclad and Waste
Management disputes. A list of the NAFTA disputes is available at NAFTALaw.org.
See NAFTALaw.org, The Disputes, available at <www.naftaclaims.com> (visited
Feb. 27, 2004). Data current as of March 2003.
128. See supra notes 84, 95 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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punished with monetary (legal) damages: there is no "NAFTA jail,"
nor does the offending country face retaliatory measures, like in the
WTO regime.130 If Methanex prevails in its claim, for example, the
United States would pay the specified amount of damages to
Methanex, and the California MTBE law would stay in effect. 3' A
state law, like California's MTBE regulation, is not rendered invalid if
the challenging investor prevails on its claim. The penalty is simply
the damage award levied against the United States. Significantly, it is
the federal government that actually pays the damage award, even if
the offending regulation, like the one in Methanex, was promulgated
by a state."3 The damage award is automatically distributed from a
Congressionally created "judgment fund," which already exists to pay
damages that the United States might incur in international
litigation.'33 Although international law provides a mechanism by
which the federal courts can decline to enforce these awards if they
are against U.S. public policy, the public policy exception is a very
high standard,' and no U.S. federal court has ever overruled an
international arbitration award based on the exception.'
Conceivably, Methanex and the United States could also choose
to settle their case. It 'is worth repeating that it is the federal
government that is a party to the arbitration, not the local or state
government that enacted the offending legislation. Consequently, the
State Department has have every incentive to litigate Chapter 11
claims forcefully, in order to save the United States from having to
pay a large damage award. That being said, settlement may be an
attractive option in a case where the evidence weighs heavily in the
claimant's favor.'36 Presumably a settlement in the Methanex case
would mean that the United States would pay a reduced damaged
award, and MTBE would be re-introduced into California gasoline in
some fashion. This solution would mean that the state of California
130. Chapter 11, supra note 70.
131. See generally id.
132. See supra notes 83, 84 and accompanying text.
133. Id.
134. 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1999).
135. See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societd Generale de l'Industrie
du Papier, 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974).
136. The Methanex claim is considered by many observers to be weak on evidence
and rooted on tenuous legal ground. See, e.g., William T. Warren, Paying to
Regulate: A Guide to Methanex v. United States and NAFTA Investor Rights, 31
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,986 (Aug. 2001).
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would have to compromise its MTBE policy in order to comply with
the U.S./Methanex settlement.
Like the WTO regime, the largest impact NAFTA has on states is
indirect, and relates to uncertain domestic political ramifications.
Although a Methanex victory would not directly impact the MTBE
law, the secondary effects on California are unpredictable. First, the
precedential effect of a Chapter 11 arbitration loss could be
detrimental to both California and the United States.'37 Imagine that
Methanex, instead of dominating the methanol market, is one of
many producers of methanol, all of whom happen to be based in
Canada. A Methanex victory in this scenario would likely prompt the
other imaginary methanol producers to sue the United States in a
NAFTA tribunal, knowing that they could ride Methanex's coat-tails
to a large damage award. One can easily foresee the potential for a
souring relationship between the United States and California, should
its MTBE law cause recurring litigation that drains federal coffers.
As always, the United States could seek the legal preemption of
California's MTBE law by suing the state in federal court.13 The
United States rarely initiates preemption suits, generally preferring to
intervene once the litigation has reached the appellate level.'39
Assuming the United States did sue to preempt California's MTBE
law, California would likely lose its case in federal court, and the
MTBE law would be preempted by NAFTA, a federal treaty.' In
plain terms, a federal court would rule that California's MTBE law is
preempted by provisions of NAFTA, and that the law is therefore
invalid.
137. Officially, Chapter 11 tribunal rulings have no force as precedent on the
rulings of future panels. See Chapter 11, supra note 70, § 1136(1). Prior tribunal
rulings, however, undoubtedly influence the actions of future panels. U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (EPA), Pollutants/Toxins, MTBE, Gasoline,
at <www.epa.gov/mtbe/gas.htm> (last updated July 2, 2002). Consequently, the EPA
is working to "significantly reduce or eliminate MTBE." Id. Also note that the EPA
has concluded that MTBE has resulted in water quality odor and taste concerns, and
"in rare instances," MTBE has been found in drinking water supplies at levels well
above the EPA's drinking water advisory standards. U.S. EPA, Pollutants/Toxins,
MTBE, Recommendations and Actions, at <www.epa.gov/mtbe/action.htm> (last
updated Sep. 17, 2003). Consequently, the EPA is working to "significantly reduce or
eliminate MTBE." Id. The fact that the EPA's position is aligned with California's
may reduce the potential for conflict in this case, but one can easily imagine instances
where the state's interest conflicts with that of the United States.
138. See supra notes 16, 21 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 98 (2000).
140. See supra notes 16, 21 and accompanying text.
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Absent preemption, the United States position is again
complicated because of dual incentives. On one hand, the United
States has an interest in reducing its potential damage award, and
attempting to maintain a healthy political relationship with the most
populous state in the union. In NAFTA disputes, the United States
can better weigh its costs against the probability of prevailing in
arbitration, because the costs of losing are unambiguous (in contrast
to the more uncertain retaliatory sanctions of the WTO). The
incentive to settle is therefore lower in a dispute where the United
States has a strong chance of winning, like the Methanex case. That
being said, the uncertain implications for U.S. federal/state relations
discussed above are still very real in the NAFTA context. Simply, a
state that violates NAFTA with impunity would be less likely to
receive Congressional money or attention than a state that plays by
the international trade rules. Conversely, states may resent being
asked to compromise their citizen-protection policies so that the
United States can simply save some money.
IV. Conclusions and Recommendations
In practice, international trade treaties have had little direct
impact on American states. This reality is both domestically
undesirable and potentially dangerous to the proliferation of free
trade. After first looking at the specific lessons of these case
examples, then drawing out some general conclusions, it becomes
clear that the status quo is neither beneficial to the states nor to the
federal government. Rather, steps should be taken to align the power
and incentives of international trade at a local level, so that states can
equally share in the benefits, and bear the burdens, of international
trade.
A. Conclusions
If Crosby makes one thing clear, it is that states cannot legislate
procurement with a disfavored foreign country where the federal
government has also enacted similar legislation.'' Even where the
state legislation is in alignment with U.S. law, or even international
law, state laws are subject to attack for the sake of maintaining the
President's ability to effectively act in the international arena. A
state's sovereignty is therefore limited by the federal government's
141. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363,381 (2000).
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involvement in international political-economic matters. However,
the validity of a state procurement law in the absence of federal
action is less clear.
1 42
If the Massachusetts law had reached a WTO panel, the law
would likely have been declared a violation of the GPA. The terms
of the GPA clearly state that procurement decisions should be made
in a non-discriminatory manner.43 On one hand, this means that
states must not discriminate in their procurement decisions. On the
other hand, states can legislate procurement without fear of
international litigation, if the legislation is arguably based on
economic, rather than political, factors.' 4
Furthermore, states have real financial incentive to, at a
minimum, monitor WTO disputes, because authorized retaliatory
sanctions levied against a state could have a devastating impact on
that state's unique export industries.145 States with larger export and
trade markets are statistically most likely to be impacted by
retaliatory sanctions, although no producers, in any state, can ever be
totally safe from the threat of retaliatory sanctions. The overall
likelihood of a state being affected by retaliatory sanctions, however,
is very low.1' 6 So although the WTO regime can directly impact a
state's economy if another country enacts retaliatory sanctions against
one of that state's producers, these scenarios will be extremely rare.
Similar to Crosby, the Methanex case teaches states some
important, specific lessons. Most legal scholars agree that Methanex's
claim is tenuous at best.' 47 However, if Methanex's claim is upheld,
some states face huge repercussions from such a decision, by virtue of
their economic strength in world markets. Taken to its logical
extreme, Methanex's legal theory assumes that all up-stream vendors
who are adversely affected by a state regulation have a valid cause of
142. Many states enacted procurement sanctions targeting South Africa during the
Apartheid regime, although the Supreme Court never ruled on the validity of these
laws. See TRIBE, supra note 10, § 6-24, at 1153-54. But see Crosby, 530 U.S. at 387-
88.
143. WTO, TRADE Topics, Plurilateral Agreement, Overview of the Agreement on
Government Procurement, available at <www.wto.org/english/
tratop-e/gproc e/overe.htm> (visited Feb. 27, 2004). See Request for Consultations
by Japan, supra note 31; Request for Consultations by the EC, supra note 31.
144. See WTO, TRADE Topics, Plurilateral Agreement, Overview of the Agreement
on Government Procurement, supra note 143.
145. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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action under Chapter 11.148 Therefore, all "investors," like Methanex,
who produce an ingredient or manufacture a part that is ultimately
the core component of another product, would have viable claims
against states that enact laws limiting or reducing the consumption of
a particular product. Because this legal theory expands the idea of
property to include an interest in end products, almost any state law
could potentially be seen as expropriating a foreign investment.
Fortunately for the states, neither international law nor common
sense support this legal theory. As evidenced by the NAFTA
Arbitration Panel's previous rulings, they are skeptical of Methanex's
legal claims and evidence.9 In particular, the Panel was genuinely
unconvinced that the California ban "related to" Methanex,
interpreting that term as requiring a legally significant connection
between the MTBE ban and Methanex or its investment.
150
Furthermore, Methanex's equitable treatment claim would likely be
moot if there had been domestic producers of methanol that were
adversely affected in a similar manner as Methanex. Indeed, the fact
that there are no domestically owned producers of a particular
product (methanol in this case) may be a rare occurrence in a world
where American corporations have extremely diversified interests
that cross-over international boundaries: identifying potential claims
of equitable treatment may be as simple as identifying the dwindling
number of industries where American corporations have no equity
interest.
The Methanex case also shows how a state's sovereignty can be
affected under NAFTA by private parties who have an investment in
that state's economy. State legislators cannot ignore the potential
impact of their legislation on Canadian and Mexican private parties
who have investments, directly or indirectly, in the states' economies.
Although the states are not impacted directly by an adverse NAFTA
decision, private parties now have the power to, at a minimum,
influence and shape state regulations, by sheer virtue of their ability
to challenge a state law in an international arbitration forum.
Ultimately though, both Crosby and Methanex illustrate that
148. Statement of Claim, supra note 87, 35.
149. See Methanex Corporation v. United States, NAFTA Tribunal First Partial
Award (Aug. 7, 2002), 172, available at <www.state.gov/s/l/c5818.htm>; Methanex
Corporation v. United States, Tribunal's Response to the Investor's Request (Sep. 5,
2002), available at <www.naftaclaims.com>.
150. See Methanex Corporation v. United States, NAFTA Tribunal First Partial
Award (Aug. 7, 2002), 138, available at <www.state.gov/s/1/c5818.htm>.
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states have no real financial incentive to legislate with an eye towards
international accords. The real economic harm of a NAFTA
arbitration loss is bore solely by the United States. At best, a WTO
arbitration loss has no economic impact on a state, and, at worst, may
affect a single, targeted product or market. Generally, if something is
enforceable under a treaty, there is a legal domestic corollary, but if
no corollary exists, these trade treaties are unenforceable in U.S.
courts. Although there is domestic political incentive to comply with
international trade treaties, there is no real financial incentive for
states to legislate in accord with U.S. international trade obligations.
Perhaps most importantly, these two cases illustrate that WTO
and NAFTA dispute resolution directly impacts federal/state relations.
Crosby illustrates the dual role that the USTR plays in WTO
disputes, and the uncertain impact of WTO dispute settlement on
inter-governmental relations. Similarly, Methanex shows how a state
law in violation of NAFTA could cost the federal government millions
of dollars. The political fallout from these types of situations could be
disastrous for future relations between a state and the federal
government. A state that violates U.S. trade obligations with
impunity would likely have a more difficult time interacting with the
federal government in other, unrelated areas.
B. Recommendations
The fact that international trade treaties have little to no direct
impact on states is an objectionable reality. The focus of this Note
has been explicitly limited to discussing the unspoken truth that
international trade treaties do not directly impact the states, despite
concerns to the contrary: this Note does not explore solutions to this
unpleasant status quo. However, this Note would be incomplete
without a few suggestions on how to address this problem. These
recommendations are purposefully general, broad and unexplored:
perhaps another author can investigate these and other options in
greater detail.
Initially, states should begin drafting legislation with an eye
towards WTO and NAFTA obligations in order to prevent potential
disputes before they occur. For example, to avoid both domestic and
WTO challenges, states could legislate procurement in an equitable
manner, without regard to foreign political or human rights situations.
Similarly, state lawmakers should familiarize themselves with NAFTA
and the WTO agreements so that they can draft around the
restrictions these agreements impose. Furthermore, for purposes of
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NAFTA, state officials should identify private investors that would be
impacted disproportionately from American investors, were a
particular practice ceased or industry regulated. This could
preemptively eliminate potential claims for violations of national
treatment standards. Even a single state legislator with a cursory
knowledge of the provisions (and loopholes) of these international
trade agreements could be the best preventive medicine for avoiding
trade treaty violations. 1'
Substantively, treaty law should be treated no differently from
other Congressional law, and steps should be taken to ensure that
states have an incentive to comply with trade obligations, while
guaranteeing that states are able to maintain their sovereignty and
their role as the laboratories of democracy. First, mechanisms must
be established so that states can be more directly involved in NAFTA
and WTO dispute resolution proceedings. Currently, states have only
an advisory role in assisting the USTR and the State Department in
the WTO and NAFTA arbitration process. In situations where a state
law is the cause of the international challenge, the United States
should require that a state official be a decision-making part of the
defense team. This way, the state is ensured a strong voice at the
proceedings, without supplanting the United States as the party to the
arbitration. The state official, and the State Department/USTR could
work in tandem to address the concerns of both the state and the
nation simultaneously. This would have the added benefit of
increasing lines of communication and could therefore help to
facilitate potential settlements.
Once states are given a meaningful role in defending treaty
arbitration claims, they should be held accountable for their own
violations of U.S. trade obligations. Because the states had no official
say in whether to join NAFTA or the WTO, they should not bear the
151. The California legislature has established the Senate Select Committee on
International Trade Policy and State Legislation to assess the impact of trade
agreements on California laws and regulations, to serve in an oversight and advice
role and to bring more accountability to the state/federal relationship as it relates to
international trade policy and its implementation. Other states that have directly
addressed these issues include Maine, Massachusetts, Oregon and Vermont. See
Hearing, supra note 6 (Appendix ii, Efforts by Other States to Examine Their Role in
International Trade Agreements). These types of special committees are not unique
to America: the British Colombia legislative assembly created a similar committee in
1998 to examine the Multilateral Agreement on Investment. See Chris Mooney,
Localizing Globalization, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, July 2-16, 2001, at 25, available
at <www.prospect.org/print/V12/12/mooney-c.html>.
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full brunt of an adverse ruling. However, Congress should create
some sort of calculation, whereby a percentage of a NAFTA
arbitration loss would be paid directly by the state treaty-violator to
the United States. The United States would still pay the judgment
award from the arbitration fund, but states would be required to
reimburse the United States for a portion of the award. In WTO
proceedings, where the United States has little control over the
products targeted for retaliation, Congress should similarly require
the offending state to pay a percentage of the value of the authorized
sanction award. This would give states the necessary incentive to
legislate with an eye towards trade treaties, and would further
motivate states to seriously evaluate suspect regulations.
Finally, state violations of international trade treaties should be
enforceable in U.S. federal courts by the United States only. Once
states have a role in defending claims in international arbitration, if a
state refuses to reimburse the United States for a portion of an
adverse panel ruling (as outlined above), the federal government
should be able to sue the state in federal court to enforce the portion
of the judgment according to the terms set forth by Congress (as
outlined above). Without exposing the states to suit from other
countries or private investors, this makes treaties directly relevant to
states through indirect domestic enforcement of international
arbitration judgments.
Ultimately, states benefit from international trade through
increased exports and foreign direct investment. These sub-national
entities, however, do not currently face the risks that accompany the
benefits of free trade. In practice, American international trade
obligations have an infinitesimal impact on the fifty states of the
Union. Despite fears to the contrary, the laboratories of democracy
are free to experiment without regard to international trade treaties.
These treaties, however, are as binding on states as other federal laws:
steps should be taken to align the risks and incentives so that states
legislate with an eye towards America's international trade
obligations, regardless of whether open trade represents sliced bread
or a sign that we are indeed nearing the end.
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